Search
Now showing items 31-40 of 50
Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are allowed to have equal priority at a school. We characterize the efficient rules which weakly/strongly respect students’ ...
Top-Cycle Rationalizability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the choice set from every subset A of a (finite) universal set X to coincide with the top cycle in A of some fixed tournament on X.
In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced ...
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules ...
Efficient Priority Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not ...
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show ...
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are ...
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. ...
Externalities and the nucleolus
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games ...
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature ...