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Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-03)
In the context of priority-based resource allocation, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability as binary relations (on the set of possible assignments) that depend on the preference and the ...
Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-04)
It is known that there are school choice problems without an efficient and stable assignment. We consider comparing assignments in terms of their stability by comparing their sets of blocking (student-school) pairs or ...
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree
and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter ...
Normative properties for object allocation problems : characterizations and trade-offs
(Université de Lausanne. École des hautes études commerciales. Département d'économie, 2021-03)
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Agents have strict preferences over the objects (possibly about not getting any object) and are assigned at most one ...
Non-manipulable house exchangeunder (minimum) equilibrium prices
(Lund University. Department of economics, 2020)
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market,
each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely
one house. The problem is to identify the ...
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences : replacement principle
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2021-03)
We study the problem of locating multiple public goods for a group of agents
with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies for each
public good a location. In Miyagawa (1998) each agent consumes ...
Respecting improvement in markets with indivisible goods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2023-09-17)
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are fixed (or are
not possible). Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. Respect for improvement means ...
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)
Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice:
each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show ...
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and
there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. ...