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Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at ...
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-04)
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is ...
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree
and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter ...
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)
Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice:
each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show ...
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of ...
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and
there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. ...