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Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/10925

Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited

Article [Version of Record]
Thumbnail
2014-02-cahier.pdf (309.9Kb)
Is part of
Cahier de recherche ; no. 2014-02.
Publisher(s)
Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.
2014-04
Author(s)
Ehlers, Lars
Affiliation
  • Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
Keywords
  • General allocation problems
  • Externalities
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Gamma-core
Abstract(s)
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying ‘individual rationality’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘strategy-proofness’, then for any problem for which the gamma-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a gamma-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the gamma-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.
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  • Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications [552]

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