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dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-16T16:49:44Z
dc.date.available2014-07-16T16:49:44Z
dc.date.issued2014-04
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/10925
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectGeneral allocation problems
dc.subjectExternalities
dc.subjectStrategy-proofness
dc.subjectGamma-core
dc.titleStrategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisitedfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dcterms.abstractWe consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying ‘individual rationality’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘strategy-proofness’, then for any problem for which the gamma-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a gamma-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the gamma-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.fr
dcterms.bibliographicCitationCahier de recherche ; #2014-02
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record


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