RSS 1.0Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications
Cette collection accueille les publications savantes et d’autres types de travaux d’auteur.e.s associé.e.s à cette unité. Voir aussi les collections Thèses et mémoires et Production étudiante de l'unité.
Recent Submissions
-
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. However, we show that there ... -
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice: each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show that any district’s admission ... -
Normative properties for object allocation problems : characterizations and trade-offs
(Université de Lausanne. École des hautes études commerciales. Département d'économie, 2021-03)We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Agents have strict preferences over the objects (possibly about not getting any object) and are assigned at most one object. How should one allocate ... -
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences : replacement principle
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2021-03)We study the problem of locating multiple public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies for each public good a location. In Miyagawa (1998) each agent consumes only his most preferred ... -
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter requirement to q-unanimity: when ... -
Non-manipulable house exchangeunder (minimum) equilibrium prices
(Lund University. Department of economics, 2020)We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation ... -
The growth impact of language standardization : Metcalfe’s Law and the industrial revolution
(2020-01-13)During the Industrial Revolution, did population growth stimulate innovation, or did causality run primarily from innovation to growth? Previous research fails to explain why between 1700 and 1850: (i) most innovation originated in three clusters of ... -
Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic. -
Two-stage majoritarian choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible alternatives while the ... -
Estimating COVID-19 prevalence in the United States: A sample selection model approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-04)
