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Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding ...
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. ...
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-02-01)
We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent ...
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-07)
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, ...
In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced ...
Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate ...
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)
Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice:
each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show ...
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and
there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. ...
On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-04)
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number
of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under ...