Weak core solution for the non-transferable utility kidney exchange game
dc.contributor.advisor | Carvalho, Margarida | |
dc.contributor.author | Collette, Raphaël | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-26T15:22:25Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | fr |
dc.date.available | 2024-01-26T15:22:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-12-20 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2023-08 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/32510 | |
dc.subject | Kidney Exchange | fr |
dc.subject | Weak core | fr |
dc.subject | Cooperative game theory | fr |
dc.subject | Maximum matching | fr |
dc.subject | Integer programming | fr |
dc.subject | Don croisé de rein | fr |
dc.subject | Noyau faible | fr |
dc.subject | Théorie des jeux coopératifs | fr |
dc.subject | Couplage maximum | fr |
dc.subject | Programmation en nombres entiers | fr |
dc.subject.other | Operations research / Recherche opérationnelle (UMI : 0796) | fr |
dc.title | Weak core solution for the non-transferable utility kidney exchange game | fr |
dc.type | Thèse ou mémoire / Thesis or Dissertation | |
etd.degree.discipline | Informatique | fr |
etd.degree.grantor | Université de Montréal | fr |
etd.degree.level | Maîtrise / Master's | fr |
etd.degree.name | M. Sc. | fr |
dcterms.abstract | Plusieurs pays possèdent des programmes de don croisé de rein (PDCR). Le but de ces programmes est d’aider les patients ayant un donneur incompatible à obtenir une greffe, en échangeant les donneurs incompatibles entre les patients. Pour pouvoir obtenir des bassins de paires incompatibles de plus grande taille, il est possible d’élargir les PDCR pour y inclure plusieurs pays ou hôpitaux. Par contre, on doit s’attendre à ce que ces derniers agissent de façon stratégique pour maximiser le nombre de leurs patients obtenant une greffe. Avec ce cadre, on peut définir le problème de don croisé de rein à plusieurs agents. Dans ce mémoire, nous modélisons ce problème comme un jeu coopératif à utilité non- transférable et nous présentons le noyau faible comme solution à ce jeu. Nous étudions empiriquement notre solution sur des exemples basés sur des données réelles et montrons qu’elle est atteignable en pratique. Nous comparons aussi le noyau faible à une autre solution présente dans la littérature: les couplages résistants aux rejets. | fr |
dcterms.abstract | In various countries, kidney paired donation programs (KPDs) are implemented. These programs aim to help patients with an incompatible donor to obtain a transplant by swapping the donors between the patients. In order to increase the size of the pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs and potentially enhance patient benefits, KPDs can be extended to include multiple countries or hospitals. However, unlike existing nationwide KPDs, strategic behaviour from these entities (agents) is to be expected. This gives rise to the multi-agent kidney exchange problem. In this work, we model for the first time this problem as a non-transferable utility game. We also propose and argue in favour of the use of the weak core as a solution concept for the game. Using integer programming tools, we empirically study our solution concept on instances from the literature, which are derived from real-world data, and show that it is attainable in practice. We also compare the weak core to another recently presented solution concept from the literature, the rejection-proof matching. | fr |
dcterms.language | eng | fr |
Files in this item
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
This document disseminated on Papyrus is the exclusive property of the copyright holders and is protected by the Copyright Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42). It may be used for fair dealing and non-commercial purposes, for private study or research, criticism and review as provided by law. For any other use, written authorization from the copyright holders is required.