Recherche
Voici les éléments 11-20 de 21
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-07)
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, ...
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-10-20)
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other ...
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, ...
Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard ...
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools.
Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints
from applications, priorities are often modeled ...
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are ...
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. ...
Externalities and the nucleolus
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games ...
Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-12-13)
We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We
examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages ...
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-03)
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading ...