Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/9777
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
Article [Version of Record]
Is part of
Cahier de recherche ; no. 2013-05.Publisher(s)
Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.Affiliation
Abstract(s)
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties
must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.