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Now showing items 11-20 of 21
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-04)
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is ...
An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-11)
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, ...
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are ...
Strategy-proof tie-breaking
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011)
We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders
and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained ...
«School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-11)
Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving options to parents while maintaining diversity, often enforced by setting feasibility constraints with hard upper and lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate ...
Externalities and the nucleolus
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games ...
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. ...
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-07)
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, ...
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-04)
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number
of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under ...
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-03)
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading ...