Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle
Series/Report no.Cahier de recherche #2011-01
We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the polluter-pays principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that assigns non-negative individual welfare and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact. We extend both the polluter-pays principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due to pollution. We also discuss the acceptability of the polluter-pays principle and compare it with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism.
AMBEC, Stefan et EHLERS, Lars, «Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle», Cahier de recherche #2011-01, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 2011, 31 pages.