Parcourir Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications par sujet "[JEL:C71] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Cooperative Games"

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  • Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)
    We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of ...

  • Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 

    Bossert, Walter; BRAMS, Steven J.; KILGOUR, D. Marc (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2000)
    It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, ...

  • Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games 

    Bossert, Walter; Derks, Jean; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
    A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper ...

  • Nearly Serial Sharing Methods 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)
    A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom ...

  • Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity 

    Sprumont, Yves; Suzumura, Kotaro (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
    The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical ...

  • Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing 

    MOULIN, Hervé; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2002)
    We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the ...