Browsing Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications by Subject "[JEL:C71] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Cooperative Games"
Now showing items 1-6 of 6
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Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of ... -
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2000)It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, ... -
Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper ... -
Nearly Serial Sharing Methods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom ... -
Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical ... -
Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2002)We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the ...