House allocation via deferred-acceptance
dc.contributor.author | Ehlers, Lars | |
dc.contributor.author | Klaus, Bettina | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-08-21T15:10:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-08-21T15:10:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-07 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/9777 | |
dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
dc.subject | Deferred-acceptance-algorithm | |
dc.subject | Indivisible objects allocation | |
dc.subject | Resource-monotonicity | |
dc.title | House allocation via deferred-acceptance | fr |
dc.type | Article | fr |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
dcterms.abstract | We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. | fr |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
dcterms.language | eng | fr |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
oaire.citationIssue | 2013-05 |
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