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Non-manipulable house exchangeunder (minimum) equilibrium prices
(Lund University. Department of economics, 2020)
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market,
each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely
one house. The problem is to identify the ...
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences : replacement principle
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2021-03)
We study the problem of locating multiple public goods for a group of agents
with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies for each
public good a location. In Miyagawa (1998) each agent consumes ...
Manipulation via Capacities Revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-03)
This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can ...
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each ...
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-10-20)
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other ...
Respecting improvement in markets with indivisible goods
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2023-09-17)
We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are fixed (or are
not possible). Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. Respect for improvement means ...
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, ...
Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard ...
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools.
Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints
from applications, priorities are often modeled ...
Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding ...