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Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree
and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter ...
Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at ...
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-04)
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is ...
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)
Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice:
each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show ...
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict
preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and
there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. ...
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of ...