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Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-05)
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly ...
Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show ...
Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-07)
A time bank is a group of people that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of time banking, e.g., high overhead costs and difficulties ...
Dynamic refugee matching
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-10)
Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and ...
School Choice with Control
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-06)
Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the
United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining racial and ethnic
balance at schools. This paper provides a foundation ...
Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at ...
Strategy-proof tie-breaking
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011)
We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders
and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained ...
«School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-11)
Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving options to parents while maintaining diversity, often enforced by setting feasibility constraints with hard upper and lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate ...
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-04)
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is ...
An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-11)
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, ...