Search
Now showing items 1-10 of 21
Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-05)
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly ...
Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-06)
We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show ...
Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-07)
A time bank is a group of people that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of time banking, e.g., high overhead costs and difficulties ...
Dynamic refugee matching
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-10)
Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and ...
School Choice with Control
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-06)
Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the
United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining racial and ethnic
balance at schools. This paper provides a foundation ...
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-10-20)
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other ...
Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at ...
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-12)
The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, ...
Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard ...
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools.
Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating different constraints
from applications, priorities are often modeled ...