Abstract(s)
Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting
behavior, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government’s
performance – i.e., whether voters are myopic. Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus
on aggregate-level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel
data, this paper offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses individual-level
evaluations of government performance in a representative survey at several points during the
electoral cycle. Our study focuses on The Netherlands, but we also provide tests of the
generalizability and robustness of our findings, and a replication in the U.S. context. The results
indicate that voter satisfaction early in the government’s term adds to explaining incumbent
voting. Thus, rather than the myopic voter, we find evidence of the abiding voter – steady at
her or his post, evaluating government performance over a long length of time.