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dc.contributor.authorGodefroy, Raphaël
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-24T18:43:55Z
dc.date.available2018-09-24T18:43:55Z
dc.date.issued2018-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/20925
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectLegislative bargainingfr
dc.subjectPublicly-provided goodsfr
dc.subjectHealth policyfr
dc.subjectGovernment policyfr
dc.subjectMedical researchfr
dc.titleThe birth of the congressional clinicfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dcterms.abstractThis paper studies the impact of mortality in the districts/states represented in key congressional groups (i.e. committees, subcommittees, and parties) on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) allocation of medical research funds across diseases, for the period 1985-2002. Exploiting the recomposition of any group after congressional elections, I find that congressmen who sit in the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies appear successful in steering more funds towards research on diseases that affect their constituents disproportionately. This effect is larger for clinical than for basic research. No other relevant congressional group, except, to a lesser extent, the House majority, seems to impact that allocation. No group significantly impacts the allocation of funds across states.fr
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Recordfr


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