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dc.contributor.authorSprumont, Yves
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-24T14:28:06Z
dc.date.available2008-01-24T14:28:06Z
dc.date.issued1997
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/2061
dc.format.extent463865 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subject[JEL:C73] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Gamesen
dc.subject[JEL:C78] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theoryen
dc.subject[JEL:C73] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Jeux stochastiques et dynamiquesfr
dc.subject[JEL:C78] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Théorie de la négociation et du "matching"fr
dc.titleCooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractIn an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue9710


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