Now showing items 1-5 of 5

  • Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games 

    Bossert, Walter; Derks, Jean; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)
    A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper ...
  • Single-basined choice 

    Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-06-03)
    Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of ...
  • Single-Peaked Choice 

    Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-09)
    Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we ...
  • Single-plateaued choice 

    Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-05)
    Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of ...
  • Single-Plateaued Choice 

    Bossert, Walter; Peters, Hans (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-05)
    Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of ...