Parcourir Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications par auteur·e "Klaus, Bettina"
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Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one ... -
Consistent House Allocation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies ... -
Efficient Priority Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize ... -
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-07)We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation ... -
Normative properties for object allocation problems : characterizations and trade-offs
(Université de Lausanne. École des hautes études commerciales. Département d'économie, 2021-03)We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Agents have strict preferences over the objects (possibly about not getting any object) and are assigned at most one object. How should one allocate ... -
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider ... -
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by ... -
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and ... -
Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary ...
