Now showing items 1-3 of 3

  • Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies 

    MANIQUET, François; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1998)
    In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows ...
  • Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good 

    MANIQUET, François; Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2002)
    We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch ...
  • Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach 

    Sprumont, Yves; MANIQUET, François (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
    We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population ...