Abstract(s)
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially
excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of
preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free
Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the
same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves
social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of
Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism
in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival
good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is
assigned.
Dans le contexte d'une économie à un bien privé et un bien non rival, nous montrons que trois principes normatifs simples forcent à classer les allocations en appliquant le critère maximin aux vecteurs de bien-être mesuré en termes du bien non rival.