Now showing items 1-4 of 4

  • Bundling under the Threat of Parallel Trade 

    CRAMPES, Claude; Hollander, Abraham; MACDISSI, Charbel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
    This paper examines the use of bundling by a firm that sells in two national markets and faces entry by parallel traders. The firm can bundle its main product, - a tradable good- with a non-traded service. It chooses between the strategies of pure ...
  • First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice 

    Encaoua, David; Hollander, Abraham (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005-01)
  • First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice 

    Encaoua, David; Hollander, Abraham (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
    The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform ...
  • Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas 

    Hollander, Abraham; MACDISSI, Charbel (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2003)
    A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below ...