First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice
Article [Version of Record]
Is part ofCahier de recherche ; #2005-01
Publisher(s)Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.
The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.
ENCAOUA, David et HOLLANDER, Abraham J., «First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice», Cahier de recherche #2005-01, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 2005, 24 pages.