Browsing Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques by Subject "Strategy-proofness"
Now showing items 1-10 of 10
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Essays on matching and preference aggregation
(2018-06-19)Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles dont deux portent sur le problème d’appariement et un sur le problème d’agrégation des préférences. Les deux premiers chapitres portent sur le problème d’affectation des élèves ou étudiants dans des ... -
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. However, we show that there ... -
Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2008-07)A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are ... -
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2001)We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by ... -
Social Choice: Recent Developments
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview ... -
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter requirement to q-unanimity: when ... -
Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive ... -
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-04)We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations ... -
Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary ... -
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice : district-based versus school-based admissions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques, 2022)Hafalir, Kojima and Yenmez (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice: each district consists of a set of schools and the district’s admission rule places applicants to the schools in the district. We show that any district’s admission ...
