Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
| dc.contributor.author | Bossert, Walter | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sprumont, Yves | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-22T14:08:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-02-22T14:08:41Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-01 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/9034 | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.title | Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable. | en |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| dcterms.language | eng | en |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 2013-01 |
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