Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems
dc.contributor.author | Ehlers, Lars | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-22T19:56:44Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-22T19:56:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/540 | |
dc.format.extent | 1346048 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
dc.subject | Matching Problem | |
dc.subject | Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets | |
dc.subject | [JEL:C78] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory | en |
dc.subject | [JEL:J41] Labor and Demographic Economics - Particular Labor Markets - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets | en |
dc.subject | [JEL:J44] Labor and Demographic Economics - Particular Labor Markets - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations | en |
dc.subject | [JEL:C78] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Théorie de la négociation et du "matching" | fr |
dc.subject | [JEL:J41] Démographie et économie du travail - Marchés particuliers de travail - Contrats: capital humain spécifique, modèles de matching, modèles du salaire d'efficacité et marchés internes du travail | fr |
dc.subject | [JEL:J44] Démographie et économie du travail - Marchés particuliers de travail - Marché du travail pour les professionnels | fr |
dc.title | Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
dcterms.abstract | The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems. | |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
oaire.citationIssue | 2005-11 |
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