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dc.contributor.authorBlackorby, Charles
dc.contributor.authorBossert, Walter
dc.contributor.authorDonaldson, David
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-22T19:56:42Z
dc.date.available2006-09-22T19:56:42Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/535
dc.format.extent198357 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectIntergenerational Equity and Justice
dc.subjectIntertemporal Social Choice
dc.subjectWelfarist and Non-Welfarist Social Evaluation
dc.subject[JEL:D63] Microeconomics - Welfare Economics - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurementen
dc.subject[JEL:D63] Microéconomie - Économie du bien-être - Egalité, justice, inégalité et autres critères normatifs et mesuresfr
dc.titleIntertemporal Social Evaluation
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractIntertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue2005-06


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