🔗 Permalink : https://doi.org/1866/492
Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions
Article [Version of Record]
Is part of
Cahier de recherche ; no. 2003-05.Publisher(s)
Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.Affiliation
Keywords
- Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem
- multi-profile social choice
- population ethics
- [JEL:D71] Microeconomics - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- [JEL:D81] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- [JEL:D71] Microéconomie - Analyse de prise de décision collective - Choix social, clubs, comités
- [JEL:D81] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Critères de prise de décision sous le risque et l'incertain
Abstract(s)
This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.
This document disseminated on Papyrus is the exclusive property of the copyright holders and is protected by the Copyright Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42). It may be used for fair dealing and non-commercial purposes, for private study or research, criticism and review as provided by law. For any other use, written authorization from the copyright holders is required.