Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously
dc.contributor.author | Dionne, Georges | |
dc.contributor.author | Lasserre, Pierre | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-22T19:55:35Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-22T19:55:35Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1985 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/409 | |
dc.format.extent | 831372 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
dc.subject | Social Values | |
dc.subject | Adverse Selection | |
dc.subject | Insurance | |
dc.subject | Risk | |
dc.title | Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
dcterms.abstract | Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously. | |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
oaire.citationIssue | 8559 |
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