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Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-09)
The 'belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions' are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation ...
Strategy-proof preference aggregation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-08)
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings
over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never ...
«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-12)
A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal ...
Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-01)
A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the
backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of ...
Size invariant measures of association: characterization and difficulties
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-08)
A measure of association is row-size invariant if it is unaffected by the multiplication of all entries in a row of a cross-classification table by a same positive number. It is class-size invariant if it is unaffected by ...
Ordinally consistent tournament solutions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and ...
Ranking by rating
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-02)
Each item in a given collection is characterized by a set of possible performances. A (ranking) method is a function that assigns an ordering of the items to every performance profile. Ranking by Rating consists in evaluating ...
Relative Nash welfarism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von ...
Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof ...
Welfare criteria from choice: the sequential solution
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-01)
We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen ...