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Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in ...
On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute and differs between deposits. the ...
La fraude à l'assurance
(1996-09)
Rank Regressions, Wage Distributions and the Gender Gap
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1996)
In this paper, we model the interactions between the distribution of male and female wages under the assumption that any change in the wage distribution of women must be offset by an opposite change in the wage distribution ...