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Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2018-09)
The 'belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions' are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation ...
Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)
We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic.
Two-stage majoritarian choice
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2020-05)
We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible ...
Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006)
We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality ...
Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness ...
Resource egalitarianism with a dash of efficiency
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2007-05)
Strategy-proof preference aggregation
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-08)
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings
over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never ...
«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-12)
A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal ...
Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-01)
A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the
backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of ...
Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2006-07)
We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions ...