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Strategyproof Choice of Acts : Beyond Dictatorship
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-05)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof ...
Relative Nash welfarism
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2017-09)
Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0-normalized von ...
Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-06)
We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no ...
Ordinally consistent tournament solutions
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-03)
A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and ...
Welfare criteria from choice: the sequential solution
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2015-01)
We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen ...
Ranking by rating
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2016-02)
Each item in a given collection is characterized by a set of possible performances. A (ranking) method is a function that assigns an ordering of the items to every performance profile. Ranking by Rating consists in evaluating ...
«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2011-12)
A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal ...
Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1997)
In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the ...
Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost ...
The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)
This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely ...