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Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2012-09)
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at ...
House allocation via deferred-acceptance
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2013-07)
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, ...
Normative properties for object allocation problems : characterizations and trade-offs
(Université de Lausanne. École des hautes études commerciales. Département d'économie, 2021-03)
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Agents have strict preferences over the objects (possibly about not getting any object) and are assigned at most one ...
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each ...
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2014-12)
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are ...