Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences
| dc.contributor.author | Bahel, Eric | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sprumont, Yves | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-05-12T21:00:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-05-12T21:00:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-05 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/23366 | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.title | Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences | fr |
| dc.type | Article | fr |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic. | fr |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| dcterms.language | eng | fr |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | fr |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 2020-06 |
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