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dc.contributor.authorBossert, Walter
dc.contributor.authorSuzumura, Kotaro
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-04T16:00:56Z
dc.date.available2008-02-04T16:00:56Z
dc.date.issued2006-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/2149
dc.format.extent159178 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectCollective Choice Rulesen
dc.subjectConsistencyen
dc.subjectPareto Ruleen
dc.subjectD71en
dc.titleA Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rulesen
dc.typeArticle
dcterms.abstractWe characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.en
dcterms.bibliographicCitationCahier de recherche ; #2006-12
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengen
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record


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