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dc.contributor.authorDudley, Léonard
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-24T14:28:36Z
dc.date.available2008-01-24T14:28:36Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/2131
dc.format.extent1482915 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subject[JEL:P20] Economic Systems - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies - Generalen
dc.subject[JEL:P21] Economic Systems - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies - Planning, Coordination, and Reformen
dc.subject[JEL:C70] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Generalen
dc.subject[JEL:P20] Systèmes économiques - Systèmes socialistes et économies en transition - Généralitésfr
dc.subject[JEL:P21] Systèmes économiques - Systèmes socialistes et économies en transition - Planification, coordination et réformefr
dc.subject[JEL:C70] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Généralitésfr
dc.titleThe Rationality of Revolution
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractDid the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue9619


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