Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.
Article [Version of Record]
Is part ofCahier de recherche ; #9627
Publisher(s)Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.
We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.
Sprumont, Y., «Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.», Cahier de recherche #9627, Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 1996, 23 pages.
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