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dc.contributor.authorHoelzemann, Johannes
dc.contributor.authorKlein, Nicolas
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-24T18:32:54Z
dc.date.available2018-09-24T18:32:54Z
dc.date.issued2018-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/20921
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectStrategic experimentationfr
dc.subjectExponential banditsfr
dc.subjectLearningfr
dc.subjectDynamic gamesfr
dc.subjectMarkov perfect equilibirumfr
dc.subjectContinuous timefr
dc.subjectLaboratory experimentsfr
dc.subjectEye trackingfr
dc.titleBandits in the Labfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dcterms.abstractWe test Keller, Rady, Cripps’ (2005) game of strategic experimentation with exponential bandits in the laboratory. We find strong support for the prediction of free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find strong evidence for behavior that is characteristic of Markov perfect equilibrium: non-cutoff behavior, lonely pioneers and frequent switches of action.fr
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Recordfr


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