Contentious Contracts
| dc.contributor.author | Hege, Ulrich | |
| dc.contributor.author | Viala, Pascale | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-01-24T14:27:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-01-24T14:27:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1997 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2022 | |
| dc.format.extent | 1638721 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.subject | [JEL:D82] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Asymmetric and Private Information | en |
| dc.subject | [JEL:K12] Law and Economics - Basic Areas of Law - Contract Law | en |
| dc.subject | [JEL:D82] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Information privée et asymétrique | fr |
| dc.subject | [JEL:K12] Droit et économie - Les domaines du droit - Droit des contrats | fr |
| dc.title | Contentious Contracts | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient. | |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 9711 |
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