Externalities and the nucleolus
| dc.contributor.author | Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ehlers, Lars | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-14T16:29:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-12-14T16:29:43Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-09 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/19684 | |
| dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
| dc.subject | Externalities | fr |
| dc.subject | Partition function | fr |
| dc.subject | Nucleolus | fr |
| dc.subject | Reduced game | fr |
| dc.title | Externalities and the nucleolus | fr |
| dc.type | Article | fr |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
| dcterms.abstract | In most economic applications, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the nucleolus from (coalitional) games without externalities to games with externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed. | fr |
| dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
| dcterms.language | eng | fr |
| UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
| oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
| oaire.citationIssue | 2017-04 |
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