Now showing items 1-2 of 2

  • Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights 

    Hotte, Louis (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 1997)
    This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As ...
  • On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games 

    Gaudet, Gérard; Lohoues, Hervé (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2005)
    We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the ...