• The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements 

    Nkuiya Mbakop, Robeny Bruno; Gaudet, Gérard (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
    This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of ...
  • The Quest for Hegemony Among Countries and Global Pollution 

    KAKEU, Johnson; Gaudet, Gérard (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2010-01)
    This paper builds on the assumption that countries behave in such a way as to improve, via their economic strength, the probability that they will attain the hegemonic position on the world stage. The quest for hegemony is modeled as a game, with ...