Parcourir Faculté des arts et des sciences – Département de sciences économiques - Travaux et publications par auteur·e "Basteck, Christian"
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On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
(Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2023-04-25)We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. However, we show that there ... -
Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
(Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, 2020-12-22)We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter requirement to q-unanimity: when ...
