• Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2004)
    We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of ...
  • An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method 

    Sprumont, Yves (Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques., 2009-12)
    We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.